ABSTRACT Massive amounts of misinformation have been spreading over social media during the 2016 U.S. election season, causing wide public concern about our information ecosystem. How does fact checking compete with misinformation for user attentions? How do misinformation and fact checking differ in their spreading patterns? And what strategies are used by social bots to promote the spread of misinformation? In this paper, we address these research questions by analyzing datasets collected by Hoaxy. We answer the first question by conducting: 1) a survival analysis shows that about 70% of claims will be fact-checked in one week and about 800 tweets with claim links are posted during this period, on average and 2) a cross-correlation analysis shows that the sharing of fact-checking articles typically lags that of misinformation by about one day. Regarding the second question, we answer it from three points of view: 1) we find that false claims can become more popular than the corresponding debunking; 2) when looking at the distribution of types of tweets, we find that fact checking tends to spread in a conversational way; and 3) bot behavior analysis shows that the most active accounts sharing misinformation behave more like social bots. To better understand how social bots spread misinformation, we conduct case studies to answer the third question. By presenting strategies such as the production of a large number of original tweets, the alternating and hijacking of hashtags, and the injection of content into conversations, we demonstrate how social bots take advantages of the recommendation features of Twitter to amplify the spread of misinformation.
I. INTRODUCTION
The rise of social media has transformed the fashion in which people consume and produce information online. Taking advantage of the digitization of the information market, however, massive amounts of fake news and conspiratorial content flood social media platforms. They overload the mind of people and lead to biased opinions on important matters. For example, Wessel [1] has examined the history behind four common false claims against vaccines that have raised confusion and fears among the public, e.g., the claim that 'vaccine causes autism'. Recent surveys from the Pew Research Center showed that 63% of Americans do not trust the news coming from social media, even though an increasing majority of respondents get the news from social media regularly (67% in 2017, up from 62% in 2016) [2] . The result of the 2016 US Presidential Elections has raised a number of concerns about the effects of misinformation [3] . The massive spread of misinformation has become a major global risk [4] and has been alleged to impact elections and threaten democracies [5] .
Misinformation in the media is not new. It has been pointed out that misinformation has been with us since the development of the earliest writing systems [6] . Although some classic examples of widespread misinformation date back to World War I and II [6] , [7] , the definition of misinformation is still not clear. A number of terms with slightly different meanings have been used to describe information disorders, e.g., disinformation, fake news, false news, junk news, etc. Generally, misinformation refers to false or misleading information [8] , [9] , while disinformation refers to false information or misleading information that is purposefully spread to deceive people [9] . The term ''fake news'' emphasizes news that are totally fabricated. The term ''false news'', on the other hand, is preferred by some notable organizations, e.g., First Draft and Facebook, because of the use of the term ''fake news'' as a political weapon [9] . A piece of misinformation is often referred to as a ''claim'', for example by Snopes (snopes.com), a famous fact-checking website. In this paper, we refer to fake news, conspiratorial content, and other forms of misinformation from low-credibility sources as unsubstantiated claims. And we will use the terms ''claim'' and ''misinformation'' interchangeably, if it causes no confusion. The spread of misinformation has motivated researchers to investigate its mechanism and to come up with ways to mitigate it [10] - [20] . The traditional way to defend against misinformation is to fact-check claims. Even though many journalists have created organizations devoted to factchecking, the sheer amount of information on social media makes it unfeasible for them to keep up with this work. Thus a number of systems, tools, and datasets have been proposed to support the efforts of the fact-checking community. Ciampaglia et al. [21] and Shiralkar et al. [22] proposed computational algorithms that enhance the ability to evaluate the veracity of dubious information. Mitra and Gilbert et al. [23] proposed CREDBANK, a dataset of tweets with associated credibility annotations. Hassan et al. [24] built a corpus of political statements worthy of fact-checking using a machine learning approach. Several systems have been developed to provide meaningful visualization of the diffusion of online misinformation, e.g., TwitterTrails [25] and RumorLens [26] . These systems, however, lack monitoring capabilities. The Emergent site (emergent.info) tracked unverified claims on the Web, whether they were subsequently verified, and how much they were shared. But the approach was based on manual curation, and thus did not scale. To guard social media, we need to find what to fact-check in real time. That is, we need a system that tracks potential misinformation.
Motivated by these limitations, in previous work, we presented a prototype and implementation of the Hoaxy system, an open platform for the study of the diffusion of misinformation and its competition with fact checking [27] - [29] . Its goal is to support the study of the diffusion of misinformation, and of its competition with fact checking. In prior work [27] , we showed some preliminary results of the misinformation diffusion by the raw datasets from Hoaxy. However, Hoaxy suffers from a limitation: it does not provide a way to connect a claim to the fact-checking articles that verify it. In this paper, we provide two automated methods to find exactly matched pairs of fact-checking & claim stories. By using this precisely matched dataset, the results we obtain are better. In addition, we show how fact-checkers (specifically, journalists) react to the appearance of new claim articles. In prior work [29] , we also studied the role of social bots in the spread of misinformation, but in the aggregated and statistical way. In this paper, we present three concrete cases to show the strategies that could be used by social bots to amplify the spread of misinformation.
In summary, we would like to address the following three research questions: RQ1: How does fact checking compete with misinformation for user attentions? RQ2: How do misinformation and fact checking differ in their spreading patterns? RQ3: And what strategies are used by social bots to amplify the spread of misinformation?
We pose our first question (RQ1) to study the competition between fact checking and misinformation. We know that fact checking and misinformation oppose each other, but how does fact checking fight against misinformation? We study this question along two dimensions: fact-checkers and fact-checking consumers. Considering fact-checkers, who are mostly the journalists who devote themselves to debunking misinformation by writing fact-checking articles, we measure their ability to check and verify any particular misinformation claim. By means of survival analysis, we find that about 70% of fact-checked claims are debunked within one week of their initial publication. During this period, about 800 tweets with links to claim articles have already been posted, on average. On the other hand, considering those users who share fact checking articles on social media platforms, we are curious about the extent to which the sharing of fact checking could lag or precede the sharing of misinformation. Indeed, we do find a moderate correlation between these two signals with a time lag of one day, suggesting that fact-checking tries hard to keep up with the spread of misinformation.
Our second question (RQ2) is about characterizing the spread of misinformation, specifically, we focus on whether the spread of misinformation is different from that of factchecking. We first perform an analysis of the popularity of a sample of debunked stories in terms of the number of tweets linking to them, and of the number of users who shared them. We find that misinformation follows a distribution with a heavier tail than that of fact checking. We then study the distribution of tweet types, i.e., original tweet, retweet, quote, reply, and find that fact checking articles are tweeted more as part of replies to other tweets, than misinformation ones do. This suggests that fact checking is more likely to spread in a conversational way. Lastly, we look at the distribution of bot score for the top most active accounts and find that accounts in the misinformation group behave more like bots than those of the fact checking group, which implies that social bots could play an important role in the spread of misinformation.
To understand more about the behavior of social bots, we address the third research question (RQ3) to study the strategies used by social bots to amplify the spread of misinformation. Based on social reinforcement theory and on social contagion models [30] - [32] , we make the hypothesis that to amplify the spread of misinformation, social bots adopt the following two rules:
R1 : Reinforce the memory of a claim as many times as possible, and R2 : Influence as many users as possible.
We present three concrete case studies to explain our hypotheses and show the extent to which social bots exhibit this kind of strategic behavior. In case study (I), bots produce numerous tweets to implement rule R1. In case study (II), bots alternate and hijack trending hashtags to follow rule R2. In the last case, bots follow both rule R1 and rule R2 by injecting misinformation content into the conversation.
Part of the present results build upon prior work [27] . Due to the limitation of Hoaxy we mentioned above, some of those results are hard to interpret. For example, in RQ1 we use correlation analysis to compare tweet-sharing behavior between fact-checking and misinformation. It would be much easier to interpret this analysis, if the tweets referred to the same instances of claim stories. Therefore, in this paper, we propose the methodology to find fact-checking & claim pairs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We introduce the data and methods in section II. Then we present the results of the three research questions with detailed discussion in section III. Finally, we make discussions of our analysis and draw conclusions in section IV.
II. DATA AND METHODS

A. BRIEF INTRODUCTION OF THE HOAXY SYSTEM
Since we use raw data from Hoaxy, a brief introduction of the Hoaxy system could be helpful for readers to understand how the datasets are collected. Unlike other systems that work with the Twitter platform by tracking hashtags, Hoaxy is based on a source list. A source list is a list of website domains, and Hoaxy tracks all tweets with a link to these websites. We use this approach because of the following observations:
• First, although it is really hard to determine the truthfulness of a claim, expert journalists have reported that some websites are continuously generating inaccurate or conspiracy content.
• Second, when sharing content on Twitter, users typically share the URL link of an article instead of the actual content, probably due to the limit on tweet message length.
• And last, Twitter provides a convenient API to track real-time tweets matching a query, specifically a method named status/filter. The source list of Hoaxy contains 120 low-credibility websites reported by expert journalists and 7 well-known fact-checking websites in the US. The tweets with links from the source list are collected by Hoaxy. At the same time, the associated relationships like URL, article content, and Twitter account are also stored in the database. Please refer to our more detailed descriptions of the implementation of Hoaxy [27] , [28] . Also, the reader is invited to visit our Hoaxy visualization website hoaxy.iuni.iu.edu, as well as the API https://market.mashape.com/truthy/hoaxy to check out what Hoaxy can provide.
When studying misinformation, the first challenge is to determine the veracity of a claim. The source-based approach of Hoaxy relies on the assumption that most of the claims published by these sources are some type of misinformation, as we cannot fact-check each individual claim. This assumption was validated by a manual verification effort based on samples of claims, showing that fewer than 15% of claims in the Hoaxy corpus can be verified [28] , [29] .
B. BOT DETECTION
We mentioned social bots several times. Indeed, researchers suggest that social bots contribute a lot in the spread of misinformation [29] . To detect these automated accounts, many supervised learning tools have been built [19] . In this paper, we choose a tool named Botometer botometer.iuni.iu.edu, previously named BotOrNot. Botometer does classification by supervised learning, including a large set of features, such as network, temporal, language, and sentiment signals [18] . The labeled examples come from honeypot and human raters. Two classifiers are provided by Botometer, one is 'standard' that includes English-based language features; the other one is 'universal' that does not include language features. In this paper, we use the standard classifier through a public API [33] . The input for Botometer is the id or screen name of a Twitter account. And the most important returned result is the so-called bot score, which ranges from 0 to 1. The lower the score, the more likely the account behaves like a human. And the higher the score, the more likely the account behaves like a bot.
C. METHODS TO PAIR FACT-CHECKING AND CLAIM ARTICLES
Hoaxy is a source-based system, including 120 claim (denoted as set S c ) and 7 fact-checking (denoted as set S f ) websites. In this paper, we find pairs of fact-checking articles with their counterparts, which are defined as: for any fact-checking article A f and any claim article A c , we say that a tuple (A f , A c ) is a matched pair, if and only if they describe the same story. Here we rely on the data from Hoaxy, thus both A f and A c should come from Hoaxy sources (S f and S c ). As a case study, we choose Snopes (snopes.com) as our only fact-checking source, because the articles in Snopes are well structured. Also, we propose two methods to automatically find the matched pairs.
• M1: direct link extraction. The method is inspired by the observation that many fact-checking articles refer to the debunked claim article. The process goes as following: for each article A s from Snopes, we extract all links from it, if any of them, A c , belongs to S c , we treat them as a matched pair (A s , A c ).
• M2: social fact-checking. This method is inspired by Hannak et al. [34] based on the fact that there exists competition between fact-checking and claim users. The process goes as: supposing there is a tweet with link to a claim article A c (A c belongs to S c ), when another tweet quotes (or is quoted by) or replies to (or is replied by) this tweet with a Snopes article A s , we treat them as a matched pair. To test the correctness of these two methods, we manually verified all produced matches on our datasets. Table 1 shows the precision of the methods. M1 gives a precision of 84%, while M2 gives a precision of around 71%. Beside these automatically matched pairs, we also selected the 20 top most popular claims and found the corresponding Snopes fact-checkings by hand.
There are about 4,000 Snopes articles in our dataset. The relatively low number of matches in Table 1 indicates a low recall. Four reasons account for this low recall. Firstly, neither all claims are fact-checked by Snopes nor all claim source are covered by Hoaxy; there are many sources linked by fact-checking articles that are not in the Hoaxy database. Secondly, not all articles from Snopes are fact-checking articles; some of them are news articles that have nothing to do with fact checking. Thirdly, Snopes uses snapshot services to link debunked claims, to avoid boosting their access counts and search ranks. Among these services, an important host called DoNotLink.com was shut down in late 2015, therefore we lost all content handled by it. Lastly, not all fact-checking pages cite the claim links as sources. Sometimes they refer to tweets or emails. Despite these limitations, our analysis suggests that automatic approaches to find matched pairs of stories are promising. The two methods are very simple and straightforward to implement. Other methods like content duplication detection and machine learning could be applied to enhance recall and precision.
To answer research question RQ1 and RQ2, we need the precise publication date and a complete set of tweets sharing these articles. Thus we executed the following steps for the 258 correctly matched pairs: (a) we removed articles with no publication date meta-data; (b) we removed pairs before 2016-05-16 because our Twitter collection started on that day. After cleaning, we finally have 73 pairs left and the following analysis focuses on this set. We also use Hoaxy to prepare the 100% tweets that share these stories, of which the misinformation group occupies 219,324 tweets by 93,210 Twitter accounts, while the Snopes group occupies 33,498 tweets by 24,651 Twitter accounts.
III. RESULTS
A. THE COMPETITION BETWEEN FACT-CHECKING AND MISINFORMATION
Social media platforms such as Twitter are the main markets where information is produced and consumed. Both misinformation producers and fact-checkers utilize social media platforms to broadcast their opinions.
Before diving into the first research question about the reaction time of fact checkers, it is helpful to inspect how soon a debunked article is tweeted after its first publication. We denote the timestamp when an article is published as t ar , and the timestamp when the article is first tweeted as t tw . The corresponding first appearance time delay can be defined as
(1) Fig. 1 shows the values of λ 1 for the 73 pairs of stories. Each point represents an article, with the y-axis values as the first tweet delay since its publication. We can see that the time delay λ 1 is, in most cases, less than one day. That is, most articles are tweeted within one day after their release. From the figure, we also observe that there are articles with negative λ 1 , which seems abnormal because it indicates that the first tweet precedes its release. Inspection reveals that most of these delays fluctuate in a small range (24 hours) and can be attributed to inaccurate timestamp metadata, e.g., missing timezone information when parsing a webpage. However, there are two articles with significant negative values, www.snopes.com/chemotherapy-doctorblows-the-whistle and www.snopes.com/defcon-warninglevel-escalated-to-3, which are due to post-editing of the articles updating its timestamp. On the other hand, articles from nationalreport.net and worldnewsdailyreport.com have significant positive delays longer than one day. Inspection shows that both sources lack official Twitter accounts, suggesting that having a representative Twitter accounts helps to promote their articles. After removing two pairs with Snopes exception, the average delay for Snopes is 0.13 hour with a standard error 0.02 hour; the average delay for the claim is 18.93 hours with a standard error of 6.86 hours. The statistics imply that new articles are often tweeted quite quickly. Our first research question is about the competition between fact-checking and misinformation. Let us explore this question along two dimensions: fact checkers and fact-checking consumers. We measure the ability of fact checkers to react to misinformation. And we use cross-correlation to show how fact-checking tweets keep up with misinformation ones.
1) THE REACTION OF FACT CHECKERS TO MISINFORMATION
The journalists from Snopes use traditional ways to fight against misinformation, that is, to fact-check a claim. The claims to be fact-checked come from public queries through email, Twitter, and so on. At the time when fact checking is underway, the claims are spreading over the social platform without countermeasures. The active period of information spreading on Twitter is often in the first week [35] . Thus the reaction time of fact checkers is quite critical. We define the reaction time as (2) where t c ar is the timestamp when the claim article is published and t f ar is the timestamp when the debunking article is pub- lished. We define v as the volume of tweets sharing the claim during λ 2 .
To better understand the reaction time, we performed a survival analysis. In this analysis, we imagine a claim as a new kind of epidemic and the corresponding fact checking as its new vaccine. The time to develop a vaccine (λ 2 ) and the population affected by the epidemic (v) are critical data in the study of epidemiology. Fig. 2 shows the result of the survival analysis. The left plot represents the distribution of reaction time λ 2 and the right figure represents the distribution of the infected population in terms of tweets volume v. From the figure, we can see that about 70% of claims are fact-checked within one week, during which about 800 tweets about the claim have been posted, on average. We also notice that the delay λ 2 can be very large, more than 2,500 hours (months). For the whole range, the average survival time for a claim article is 346 hours (about 14 days) with a standard error 71 hours (about 3 days); the average number of survival tweets for a claim article is 1901 with a standard error 418. The statistics imply that it takes a non-short time for journalists from Snopes to debunk a claim and a reasonable amount of tweets with links to the claim has been posted during that time. Since this analysis focuses only on claims debunked by Snopes, it does not address the question of the reach of claims that are verified by other fact-checkers, or that are not verified at all.
2) THE REACTION OF FACT-CHECKING CONSUMERS ON TWITTER
The purpose of fact-checking articles is to let people know the truth about claims. We view users that share fact-checking or claim articles as information consumers. Let us first explore how fact-checking consumers react to claim consumers through a story example. The story focuses on the claim that Mexico pledged to close the borders with the US if Trump was elected President, which was debunked by Snopes soon after its publication. The claim article URL is archive.is/U4dtG; we used the archived version from archive.is because of the deletion of the original page. The corresponding Snopes fact-checking URL is snopes.com/mexico-border-trump-elected. Fig. 3 shows the timeline signals of tweets sharing both claim and factchecking. From the figure we see the typical phases of information diffusion on Twitter: at first publication (around Jul 13), the story attracted lots of attention; after a few days (around Jul 15), it decreased dramatically and even disappeared; months later (around Aug 27), the disappeared article started to spread again. We also observe a correlation of the sharing behavior between claim and fact-checking. If we look carefully at the aligned valleys and peaks between the two time series, we see that claim changes precede those of fact checking. For example, the claim time series went down dramatically on Jul 20 and the fact-checking series followed on Jul 21; the claim series appeared again on Aug 29 and the fact-checking series followed on Aug 31.
To generalize our findings, we aggregate the daily volume of tweets linking to claim or fact-checking articles. Fig. 4 plots the aggregated daily volume of tweets in the two sets. The y-axis is in the logarithmic scale. We can see that the daily volume of claims is, most often, much higher than the fact checking, suggesting that claim article draws more attention than Snopes articles. While both time series display significant fluctuations, the presence of aligned valleys (e.g., around Jul 1) and peaks (e.g., around Nov 3) suggests cross-correlated activity.
To better understand this, we perform a lagged cross-correlation analysis, which measures the similarity between two time series as a function of the lag. When calculating the cross-correlation, we hold the time series of claims and shift that of the fact-checking. Thus a higher correlation at a positive lag indicates that the sharing of fact-checking lags that of claims. Fig. 5 shows the result of the cross-correlation between the two time series, with shifting the fact-checking from −7 days (left) to +7 days (right). We observe a strong peak around one day. This indicates that fact-checkers often react to new claim articles spreading on Twitter. This finding refines our previous analysis, which had suggested a delay of less than a day between sharing of claims and fact-checking based on aggregate traffic across articles [27] . Please note that the resolution here is in days, which is different from the previous hourly resolution. In this paper, due to the low hourly volume of the current dataset, we cannot perform cross-correlation in an hourly resolution.
B. CHARACTERIZING THE SPREAD OF MISINFORMATION AND FACT-CHECKING
To characterize the distinctions between the diffusion of misinformation and fact-checking, we start by presenting the distribution of article popularity. Then we look into how different types of tweets are used. And finally, we study bot behavior.
1) DISTRIBUTION OF ARTICLE POPULARITY
We measure the popularity of a given story (either misinformation or fact-checking) by counting either the total number n 1 of times its URL was tweeted or the total number n 2 of accounts who tweeted it. Fig. 6 shows that the distributions of the two quantities display heavy tails. These observations suggest that misinformation is more popular than fact checking, with misinformation being spread by accounts that, in some cases, can generate huge numbers of tweets. These findings are consistent with those of Vosoughi et al. [36] . While it is expected that active users are responsible for producing a majority of news shares, the strong difference between misinformation and fact-checking deserves further scrutiny.
2) DISTRIBUTION OF TWEET TYPES
We can classify four types of Twitter content: original tweets, retweets, quotes, and replies. In this analysis, we treat quotes as retweets for simplicity, since quotes are similar to retweets but with an additional comment. Fig. 7 shows the distribution of the types of tweets in our dataset. Here we highlight the top active accounts as a separate group because the 10% most active accounts produce about 50% tweets for claims and 30% for fact-checking. We refer to the full dataset as all and to the dataset of top active accounts as top. For both datasets, we find that retweets are the most common category (about 70% for claim and 40-50% for fact checking). When looking at replies, they are more frequent in the fact-checking group (over 20%) than in claims (less than 10%). This difference is even more significant in the top dataset, where replies of fact-checking occupy about 40% vs. around 10% for claims. These results suggest that fact-checking is more likely to spread in a conversational way.
3) DISTRIBUTION OF BOT SCORE
This leads us to the question of how many of the tweets spreading claim articles are really made by humans. Using Botometer (botometer.iuni.iu.edu) we calculate a bot score for each account in our dataset. A high bot score suggests that the user account is likely to be a bot. Fig. 8 shows the distribution of bot scores for the 10% most active accounts tweeting fact-checking and claim articles. By conducting a Mann-Whiney U test, we find that these two groups have significantly different scores -the claim group has overall higher bot scores than the fact-checking group. Moreover, among the 10% most active accounts, 19% of the claim group and 9% of the Snopes group have bot score above 0.5. Both results are consistent with those based on larger sets of low-credibility articles (most of which are not debunked), suggesting that the most active spreaders of claims are more like bots [29] .
C. STRATEGIES USED BY SOCIAL BOTS: CASE STUDIES
We mentioned earlier that social bots can play an important role in the spread of misinformation. Here we provide some concrete examples to show how social bots amplify misinformation diffusion. Based on the social reinforcement theory and social contagion models that a user prefers to adopt a social behavior if it has received reinforcement from various social groups [30] - [32] , we hypothesize two rules (R1 and R2) that are followed by social bots to amplify the spread of misinformation. Considering the recommendation mechanisms of the Twitter platform, we present the following strategies that are being used by social bots.
1) CASE (I) PRODUCING A LARGE NUMBER OF ORIGINAL TWEETS
The simplest strategy that follows rule R1 is to produce a large number of original tweets. To demonstrate this, we present case study (I), in which we investigate the spread of an unverified claim (www.veteranstoday.com/2016/ 08/24/vt-exclusive-largest-pedophile-ring-in-history-70000-members-heads-of-state-the-rats-scramble) from the low credibility source veteranstoday.com. The numeric statistics of the tweets sharing this article are shown in Fig. 9(a) . Among the total 11,944 tweets, 6,454 (54%) come from one single account @censorednewsnow. And 95% of these tweets from @censorednewsnow are original tweets. To avoid detection of such anomalous behavior by Twitter, this account posted a low daily volume of tweets over a long time rather than a large burst of tweets in a short time. We can observe this behavior in Fig. 9(b) . However, researchers have found that potential readers increase fast only in the early stage of a trend [37] , and most of the active periods of spread are a week or shorter [35] . Therefore, this behavior of slow posting over seven months is not normal. At the time of this writing, the account is still active, suggesting that Twitter's anti-abuse algorithms fail to detect this kind of stealth tactic.
2) CASE (II) ALTERNATING AND HIJACKING HASHTAGS
A hashtag is a keyword or a phrase used to describe a topic or a theme. Users make use of hashtags to categorize 
TABLE 2. Case (II):
Text of sampled tweets. We sampled the first two original tweets in each month. These original tweets are posted by @censorednewsnow for a false claim (www.veteranstoday.com/2016/08/24/vt-exclusive-largest-pedophile-ring-in-history-70000-members-heads-of-state-the-rats-scramble). The URL t.co/5SZ9DjdwRM is the Twitter shortened version of the original URL of the claim article.
and summarize their posts on Twitter. Moreover, there is a recommendation mechanism behind hashtags: Twitter may recommend trending hashtags based on a user's profile. Bots could take advantage of the hashtag feature by posting tweets with trending hashtags, so that their tweets would have a high chance to catch the attention of users who follow VOLUME 6, 2018 FIGURE 10. Case (II) Hijacking the hashtags. Diffusion network for the #MeToo hashtag. Nodes represent Twitter accounts. When account A retweets B, the direction of this edge is from B to A. And when account A mentions B, the direction of this edge is from A to B. We perform k-core decompositions and consider the k ≥ 3 core of the network for ease of visualization. Roughly two clusters can be observed. Many accounts with suspicious screen names appear in the left cluster.
the trends [38] . This strategy is an indirect way to achieve rule R2. Let us illustrate this by two concrete examples. The first example follows the data from Case (I). When we investigate the actual content of the tweets in Case (I), we find that there are more tricks used by this bot. Table 2 shows a sample of tweet text, namely the first two original tweets in each month posted by @censorednewsnow. Along with the timeline, the text of the tweets keeps changing. The text started with a meaningful sentence, i.e., the title of the article. Then it was reduced to some keywords. And finally, only some meaningless phrases remained. During these changes, especially in the last stage, one significant feature is that the account alternated the hashtags.
To illustrate the hijacking of hashtags, let us consider another example -the #MeToo hashtag. #MeToo spread virally in October 2017 as a hashtag used on social media to help demonstrate the widespread prevalence of sexual assault and harassment. However, we also noticed that social bots utilized this viral hashtag for unintended purposes. Fig. 10 illustrates a diffusion network for the #MeToo hashtag, visualized by tools from the Observatory on Social Media (OSoMe) [39] . Nodes represent Twitter accounts and links represent the propagation of the hashtag through retweets and mentions/replies. The original interactive visualization can be accessed at osome.iuni.iu.edu/tools/networks/#?hashtag=%23metoo &network_type=rm&start_date=10-13-2017&end_date=10-21-2017. The network can roughly be divided into two clusters. In the left cluster, we observe that most of the accounts have suspicious screen names, such as 5YJeeCL8fw2tRCN, 3C0VtZexu90wpiP, 4vtCoHa6OVtOWzm, etc. We believe these accounts were social bots; in fact, Twitter has since suspended them. However, due to the suspension, we cannot fetch the actual content of these tweets. Anyway, this is a good example to show how social bots hijack trending hashtags.
3) CASE (III) INJECTING INTO THE CONVERSATION
Conversations happen all the time on Twitter, and they all start with just one reply to a tweet. When a user navigates a tweet, all replies to this tweet are listed below it, so that users can read through these comments and even join the conversation by replying. Moreover, the recommendation of the Twitter platform makes it easy to find and join popular conversations which users may be interested in. We believe that social bots can take advantage of this feature to inject content into these conversations [12] . In section III-B2, we observed that the spread of misinformation is less likely to occur in a conversational fashion. While this is true in general, we did observe that in some cases, replies make up the majority of messages that spread misinformation. Here we present one such case, namely the spread of the article www.politicususa.com/2017/02/18/trump-lie-exposedproof-indebted-russian-mobsters.html. Among the total 4,068 tweets, 1,935 (48%) are from the single account @garydixson, which has since been suspended (see Fig. 11(a) ). And of these tweets from @garydixson, 1,407 (73%) are replies, indicating that the replies dominate the spreading. We looked at who are the users that are replied to. Fig. 11(b) shows a word cloud of the replied-to users, and we can see that the top four frequently replied-to users are CNN, CNNPolitics, thehill and NBCNews, all mainstream news organizations. Table 3 provides statistics about these four accounts. Each of them has millions of followers.
Finally, we investigated the actual content of the replies. Table 4 shows the first two replies to each of the four accounts mentioned above. We can see that many of the replies have no meaningful content beyond the links. In summary, the likely bot took advantage of the reply feature to inject the content into the conversations. It tried to target conversations started by influential news media accounts, because these accounts can draw a lot of attention.
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Social media provide excellent examples of marketplaces of attention where different memes vie for the limited attention of users [40] . The rise of digital misinformation is calling into question the integrity of our information ecosystem.
In previous work [27] , we obtained some preliminary results by analyzing the Hoaxy datasets. However, these datasets are divided into two independent claim and fact-checking groups. This is a limitation of Hoaxy, because they do not provide a way to connect a claim with its related fact-checking articles, making the results presented in previous work hard to interpret. In this paper, to overcome this limitation, we propose two automated methods to find fact-checking & claim pairs. Using these enriched datasets, we address the following three research questions.
The first research question is about how fact checking is competing with misinformation. We answer it in two dimensions: fact-checkers and fact-checking consumers. Survival analysis shows that fact-checkers are working hard to debunk a claim, but their efforts struggle to keep up with the volume of misinformation. At the same time, fact-checking consumers that share tweets of debunking articles are keeping up with the sharing of misinformation. Starting with a story example, we observe a moderate correlation of tweets sharing behavior between claim and fact checking. Our analysis shows that the sharing of fact-checking content typically lags that of misinformation by about one day.
The second research question is about how to characterize the spread of misinformation. To answer, we start by presenting the distributions of article popularity. The results suggest that misinformation can be more popular than fact checking. We then look into how different types of tweets are used in the spread of information. The distribution of the types of tweets suggests that compared to the spread of misinformation, fact checking is more likely to spread in a conversational way. And finally, we study the bot behavior among the top active accounts. The distribution of bot score indicates that the most active accounts that share tweets with links to claim are more like bots.
To study social bots, we explore the third research question about what strategies social bots use to amplify the spread of misinformation. Based on reinforcement theory and social contagion models, we hypothesize two rules that social bots should follow in order to maximize their influence. We present three case studies: producing large numbers of original tweets, alternating and hijacking hashtags, and injecting content into conversations. In these cases, many suspicious accounts (probably bots) have been suspended by Twitter, suggesting that Twitter has made much progress in defending against social bots; but we did find that a few accounts are still alive and keep displaying deceptive behaviors.
Of course, as a case study, our methodology suffers some unavoidable limitations. Claims are from different sources, which makes the results less prone to the selection of sources. However, for the fact-checking sources, we choose Snopes as the only source, which could pose threats to generalizability of the findings. To mitigate this issue, we took two extra steps. First, we report standard errors to give an idea of the uncertainty in our observations of the following three results:
• How soon is an article tweeted since its publication, see Fig. 1 .
• How long it takes fact-checkers to publish the debunking article for one specified claim, see left panel of Fig. 2 .
• How many tweets with links to a claim article are posted before its fact-checking article is released, see right panel of Fig. 2 The second extra step is that we replicate some analyses on a much larger dataset from Hoaxy. This dataset includes tweets from 7 fact-checking sites and 120 claim sites with the period from 2017-05 to 2018-01. The number of tweets is 36,066,669, of which 94.9% contain links to claim sites. The number of articles is 742,942, of which 96.0% are from claim sites. Note that in this case we do not perform any article pairing process to determine which fact-checking articles debunk claim articles. Also note that although the number of sources is unbalanced across the two categories, the analyses are not per-source based, and thus should not be affected by this unbalance:
• Distribution of article popularity, the replication is Fig. 12 , while the original version is Fig. 6 • The composition of types of tweets, the replication is Fig. 13 , while the original version is Fig. 7 . We can see that the replicated results are consistent with the above ones.
We also would like to discuss additional approaches that could be used to complement our analysis, but that do somewhat fall beyond the scope of this study. The first one is to use hashtags to collect tweets and to validate our results. This is a very straight-forward thought, but hard to implement. The main reason is that it is never an easy task to determine the veracity of articles, nor the stance of users. Hoaxy is a source-based system that collects tweets with links to the specified sources. In previous work, we did a manual verification of articles from these claim sites to demonstrate that most articles published from claim sites are indeed lowcredibility, mostly unverifiable or even totally fake. In this way, we bypass the hard task of determining the veracity of each article. We never determine the stance of users, because when tweets with links to claim sites are posted, the spreading of misinformation has been achieved -users have already been exposed to the claim articles. However, If we collect tweets by using hashtags, we would have to determine the veracity of tweet text and the stance of users. Unlike the source-based approach, we cannot say that tweets with a specific hashtag share fact-checking information or misinformation. There would be a tremendous work to manually classify a reasonable amount of tweets into fact-checking or claim.
The second approach is to conduct experiments on datasets from Facebook. While Facebook is a very popular social network platform, and both fact-checking and misinformation have been observed spreading on the platform, the limitations of collecting data from Facebook is significantly harder than from Twitter. Due to privacy settings, most Facebook data is not available to researchers, unlike Twitter's, which is public by default. Moreover, even in the case of public posts on Facebook, the Facebook API does not provide a streaming endpoint similar to the one used here.
In addition, we would like to discuss possible application scenarios for our work. We believe our work could be applied in the following three fields. First, fact-checkers may want to know which claims have been fact-checked. Fact-checking is a collective behavior, and many journalists working on the same claims. However, it takes coordination to know which claims have been already fact-checked. Though the methodology we proposed to find pairs of fact-checking & claim is not perfect, it could be promising to enhance the method to make it applicable for such coordination. Second, researchers may want to further understand the dynamics of misinformation. Our analysis presents the patterns of spread of misinformation that could provide some insights in this direction. And last, the case studies of social bots present the amplification strategy, which could be helpful for researchers to develop tools to detect this kind of abuse.
In the future, we plan to extend this study in two directions. One is to enhance the capability of the Hoaxy system, by improving the performance of matching claim and fact-checking articles. Methods like content duplication detection and machine learning could be applied. The other direction is to further study the role that social bots [19] , [29] , [41] play in the spread of misinformation. We hope our methods and analysis can contribute to the research community defending against the spread of digital misinformation.
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